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µOne cannot legislate kindness¶1 Ambiguities in European 
legal instruments on non-custodial sanctions. 
Abstract 
 Non-custodial sanctions, particularly those that are implemented in the 
community, have different historical roots in common law and in civil law 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, various European instruments have emerged that seek 
to shape the imposition and the manner of implementation of such sanctions across 
the continent in a uniform manner.  They reflect an apparent consensus about 
penal values, which culminated in Europe in 1992 with the adoption of the 
European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures and of the 
Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing. Nevertheless, in spite of the 
apparent pan-European consensus, some tensions remained as a result of 
underlying doctrinal differences and of the compromises that were required to 
accommodate them.  
 In the 21st century further European initiatives have sought to go beyond 
the 1992 instruments and IRFXV RQ µZKDW ZRUNV¶ DQG on the development of 
probation services. In the process, sight may have been lost of the initial objectives 
of penal reductionism, which were so important in 1992. This shortcoming can be 
addressed by reconsidering the approaches that had been rejected in the earlier 
search for consensus and by developing a more comprehensive understanding of 
the human rights safeguards to which all penal sanctions should be subject.  
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Introduction: Setting standards  
 In Europe the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the apogee of standard 
setting for non-custodial sanctions. This was particularly true of community 
sanctions and measures, the implementation of which requires more detailed 
regulation than other less interventionist non-custodial sanctions.2  This process 
culminated in 1992 with the adoption by the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe of both the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures and 
the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing.  
 Taken together the two instruments developed a comprehensive European 
penal policy on non-custodial sanctions. This policy set a clear course towards 
embracing both of what Christine Morgenstern (2002: 63) has identified as the two 
broad solutions prominent at the time for addressing the problems then facing 
penal law: the replacement of imprisonment by non-custodial sanctions and the 
development of such sanctions in a way that is compatible with the rule of law.  
The simultaneous and unanimous adoption of the two instruments by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe indicates that at the time they 
were adopted there must have been a large degree of consensus about the values 
that they embodied.  In next section we consider the historical process by which 
this consensus was created. We then turn to the arguments that were rejected in 
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the course constructing  this consensus. The following section of the paper 
considers attempts in the 21st century to go beyond the 1992 framework by 
developing further instruments focussed on the implementation of community 
sanctions and measures. It argues that these instruments unmoored the debate 
about non-custodial sanctions from broader policy objectives of reducing the level 
of penal intervention. Finally, we offer some thoughts on how to ensure that sight is 
not lost of the key 1992 objectives.  
 
The basis of the underlying consensus 
What makes the consensus of the early 1990s surprising, in Europe in particular, is 
that historically there had been significant differences between the approaches to 
alternatives to imprisonment developed in the various jurisdictions. These 
differences are best illustrated by a brief and somewhat ideal-typical portrayal of 
the historical models on which they drew.  
7KHµSXUH¶VXVSHQGHGVHQWHQFH 
According to the classical model of criminal law, which dominated continental 
Europe from the late 18th century onwards, offences should be defined as precisely 
as possible, with fixed penalties for every offence.  When an offence has been 
committed, it should be prosecuted without exception; following a conviction, the 
fixed penalty should be imposed without variation by the courts; and the 
punishment, typically imprisonment, should be carried out in full. In its extreme 
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form this model is usually associated with the idealism of the revolutionary French 
Code of 1791, and its proliferation across much of Western Europe. The classical 
model sought to prevent the abuse of discretion by abolishing it at different stages 
in the process. This was seen as the epitome of the legality in criminal justice. 
Supporters argued that if punishment has been set appropriately in legislation, it 
would be proportionate to the crime and that it should apply equally to all who 
chose to break the law (Dupont, 1979). Their equal ability to choose how to 
conduct themselves was simply assumed (Pieth, 2001; Van Zyl Smit, 1997).  
From the second half of 19th century onwards the continental classical ideal 
came into conflict with the positivist challenge to the notion of untrammelled choice. 
For positivists, offenders could be seen primarily either as innocents, who had 
drifted into a crime by happenstance, or as hardened habitual criminals, whose 
capacity to choose not to commit crime had all but disappeared. Evidence was that 
a depressing number of offenders committed further offences, particularly those 
who had been jailed.  What was to be done? 
For those whose primary thinking was shaped by the classical ideal, the 
answer was to try and preserve resistance to abuse of discretion inherent in that 
model, while dealing with the reality that it did not always function as an effective 
crime prevention mechanism. /HDYLQJDVLGHWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHµKDELWXDO¶RIIHQGHUV
the answer was an alternative to imprisonment:  a suspended sentence, at least for 
WKH UHODWLYHO\ µLQQRFHQW¶ ILUVW DQG \RXQJ RIIHQGHUV 6XFK RIIHQGHUV ZRXOG KDYH D
proportionate term of imprisonment imposed upon them, but its coming into effect 
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would be (wholly or partially) suspended for a period of time. If during that time 
the offender did not commit an offence his sentence would not come into effect. 
This approach had the advantage of preserving the notion that the offender had a 
choice to offend. He was simply given a further choice with the additional threat of 
punishment underlying the suspended sentence.  
Additional conclusions flowed from this approach. If the offender was 
capable of rational choice, then there was no need to offer him any assistance or 
impose any restrictions during the period of suspension, other than the actual 
sentence if he committed a further offence (and was caught). In fact the distrust of 
discretion worked in the opposite direction. It was considered undesirable for the 
courts to have the power to judge individuals and to order tailored intervention in 
their lives ± other than the loss of liberty which formally applied equally to all who 
were subject to it. For the same reason there should be no discretion in bringing 
suspended sentences into effect against those who had reoffended during the 
period of suspension. 
The first legislation to allow the suspension of sentences of imprisonment 
was heavily restrictive, in line with this classical model. Belgian and French 
legislation, of 1888 and 1891 respectively, provide primary examples of laws that 
permitted suspension of short sentences of imprisonment on the sole condition that 
the convicted offender not reoffend during the suspension (Ancel, 1971: 13-14). 
Much the same effect was achieved after 1895 in the territories that would become 
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modern Germany, by routinely granting pardons to offenders on condition that they 
not commit further offences (Meyer-Reil, 2005). 
From the late 19th century onwards, provision also began to be made in these 
countries for early release from prison. In its 19th century incarnation in France and 
%HOJLXP HDUO\ UHOHDVH ZDV RIWHQ D IRUP RI µSDUROH¶ LQ ZKLFK released offenders, 
unlike those whose sentences were suspended from the point of conviction, were 
VXEMHFW WR VXSHUYLVLRQ LQ WKH FRPPXQLW\ E\ FLYLOLDQ µFRPLWpV GH SDWURQDJH¶
(Christiaensen, 2004). Early release in these systems had a close connection to the 
ancient power of the sovereign to pardon, but now on a more systematic basis and 
to a growing range of offenders (Whitman, 2003).     
 Probation    
While the suspended sentence was emerging as an alternative to imprisonment 
within the broadly classical tradition, a very different model was developing in 
FRPPRQ ODZ MXULVGLFWLRQV 7KLVPRGHOZDV µSUREDWLRQ¶ UHJDUGHG LQLWLDOO\ DW OHDVW
simply as a way of avoiding the formal imposition of punishment entirely and 
replacing it with some form of community-based supervision. Probation emerged 
almost simultaneously in England and in the US (Timasheff 1943a: 1-2). This 
reflected the pragmatism of the common law with developments in the US serving 
as a source of continual inspiration for those in England.   
Probation in Europe undoubtedly began in the United Kingdom (Vanstone, 2008). 
Although formally enshrined in national criminal justice only in 1907 by the 
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Probation of Offenders Act, the English probation movement traces its origins back 
further. In his centenary review of its development, Timasheff (1943a: 12-13) 
identified the origins of British probation in the work of a Birmingham judge in 1841, 
ZKRZDVSUHSDUHGWRSODFHµMXYHQLOHGHOLQTXHQWV¶XQGHUWKHVXSHUYLVLRQRISDUHQWV
masters, or volunteers. Nellis (2007: 28) also pointed to a tradition in English penal 
practice as early as the 18th FHQWXU\ RI H[HUFLVLQJ µSUHYHQWDWLYH MXVWLFH¶ ZKLFK
aimed to avoid the imposition of punishment in favour of judicial oversight. 
 The institutionalisation of English probation was primarily a product of 
Victorian civil society, rather than a principled development of the criminal justice 
system. 19th century English public discourse was characterised by both explicit 
moralism and considerable emphasis on charity as a response to social problems 
(Mair and Burke, 2012: 7-24). Both strands contributed to the formation of 
rudimentary analogues of modern probation institutions. Crime was viewed 
principally as a product of social and moral decay, which led, it was feared, to the 
FUHDWLRQRIDµFULPLQDOFODVV¶XQLWHGDgainst the prosperous middle-class mainstream 
(Emsley, 2010: 177-187). This inspired the intervention of numerous charitable 
organisations into the lives of offenders, which aimed to secure the spiritual and 
VRFLDO µVDOYDWLRQ¶ RI RIIHQGHUV E\ HQJDJLQJ ZLWK alcohol addiction. These 
organisations SOD\HG D VLPLODU UROH WR WKH FLYLOLDQ µFRPLWpV GH SDWURQDJH¶ LQ
Francophone Europe, with the important difference that, unlike their continental 
counterparts, they focused on offenders prior to (or instead of) formal sentence, 
rather than on released prisoners.  
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Gradually these activities were incorporated into statute and the charitable 
interveners replaced with a formal secular institution, the probation service, created 
in 1907 (Nellis, 2007: 28-31). The activities FRPSULVLQJ (QJOLVK µSUREDWLRQ¶ DUH
diverse, having been accumulated piecemeal over the sHUYLFH¶V H[LVWHQFH VHH
McGarva, 2008: 269-278 for a comprehensive overview of modern functions). From 
the outset, the probation service was responsible for non-custodial supervision of 
offenders, especially juveniles. During the interwar years, the probation service 
H[SDQGHG LWV UROH LQ DGXOW MXVWLFH DQG WKH SUREDWLRQ RIILFHUV¶ WUDGH XQLRQ WKH
National Association of Probation Officers, campaigned with some success for 
SUREDWLRQVXSHUYLVLRQWREHVHHQDVµSDUWRIDZLGHUVRFLDOZRUN³SURIHVVLRQ´¶1HOOLV, 
2007: 34) ± albeit of a specialist criminal justice variety. Critically, until the 1990s, 
this supervision was largely regarded as an alternative to punishment, the 
imposition of which was postponed conditionally: on the offender not reoffending or 
infringing other requirements of probation (Mair, 1998: 263). The focus was on the 
social work aspects of probation, summed up by the sHUYLFH¶VIDPRXVLQMXQFWLRQWR
µDGYLVH DVVLVWDQGEHIULHQG¶RIIHQGHUV&DQWRQ, 2011: 30; Raynor, 2012: 176-177). 
7KHLU UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV LQ WKLV DUHD FRQWLQXHG WR H[SDQG DV D UDQJH RI µFRPPXQLW\
VHQWHQFHV¶ RWKHU WKDQ VXSHUYLVLRQ GHYHORSHG GXULQJ WKH VHFRQG KDOI RI WKH WK
century. 
 The English probation sHUYLFHDOVRGHYHORSHGDNH\UROHLQWKHµDIWHUFDUH¶RI
ex-prisoners from the 1920s onwards, initially alongside wider civil society, but 
formally taking over in 1965. This, in turn, morphed into a formal responsibility for 
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the supervision of offenders released early from prison on parole (Maguire, 2007: 
399-401).     
Consensual synthesis or a synthetic consensus? 
The suspended sentences of continental Europe and the probation systems of the 
common law did not exist in separate silos. Even before the English probation 
system was enshrined in legislation, probation had been the subject of debate in 
the continental European-GRPLQDWHG µVFLHQWLILF¶ FRQIHUHQFHV RI WKH th and early 
20th centuries, which adopted resolutions that were the early forerunners of the 
European standards of the 1990s. To take but one example: the International Penal 
Law Association, established in 1889 by the three leading continental European 
criminal justice experts of their generation, Professors van Hamel of the 
Netherlands, von Liszt of Germany and Prins of Belgium, included in its constitution 
that the Society regarded the substitution of short terms of imprisonment by other 
equally effective punishments as possible and desirable.3 From its inception the 
meetings of the Society were also attended by representatives of common law 
countries, including both the UK and the US, who could and did accept this article of 
constitutional faith and simply interpreted it as applicable to the existing probation 
system. They also supported proposals for the increased use of carefully calibrated 
fines as less interventionist alternatives to imprisonment proliferated.4   
Gradual changes in national practice followed from this. In particular the 
continental European systems began to attach conditions to some of their grants of 
suspension of sentences: this happened not only in the Franco-Belgian-German 
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core but also in most other northern, western and southern European countries 
(Timasheff, 1943b: 1-62; van Kalmthout and Durnescu, 2008: 3-5, 10-12).   
As in England, volunteer bodies that had assisted prisoners in the 
1HWKHUODQGV DQG RWKHU FRXQWULHV EHJDQ WR EH WUDQVIRUPHG LQWR µSURIHVVLRQDO¶
probation organisations. Typically, they too were employed directly or indirectly by 
the stDWHDQGDSSURDFKHGWKHLUWDVNZLWKDVWURQJµVRFLDOZRUN¶IRFXVEXWRSHUDWHG
inevitably in the penal shadow of the criminal justice system.  From the beginning 
these organisations had much in common when it came to dealing with released 
prisoners. Gradually their affinity increased in the area of implementing community 
sentences too, as suspension of imprisonment in continental Europe increasingly 
became conditional on submission to community sanctions and measures. By 1981, 
their interests were sufficiently common across Europe to allow the establishment 
of the 'Conférence Permanente Européenne de la Probation' (CEP) (Scott, 2006).  
The CEP included not only probation officers for the United Kingdom, where this 
term originated, but also officials responsible for working with offenders serving 
suspended sentences or who had been released conditionally in other European 
countries.  
After the Second World War, scientific conferences about non-custodial 
sanctions continued. In the early years the United Nations played a prominent part 
in shaping the debate in Europe and elsewhere. Thus in 1952 a European Seminar 
on Probation was held in London under the auspices of the Social Commission of 
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It revealed that there were 
11 
 
still significant differences between continental European systems, in which the 
simple suspended sentence was the norm, and the common-law probation model, 
which still did not require a formal criminal conviction.  
Common ground was sought in probation techniques rather than law. At the 
London seminar, Marc Ancel noted the increasing professionalization of social 
workers involved in supervising offenders throughout Europe. He observed that 
various continental systems were making legal changes:  
The admission, timid at first, of probation into the criminal law of the 
Continent may thus contain the germ of later reforms which will tend to 
transform the old Continental criminal procedure into a modern procedure of 
défense sociale. (Ancel, 1952: 38)  
Ancel observed, however, that the concerns of the lawyers for procedural 
probity should and could be met by linking probation to the existing institution of 
the suspended sentence.5  
The United Nations continued to play a significant role in the development of 
alternative sanctions in Europe, particularly through the work of its formal affiliate, 
the Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI). A major HEUNI 
conference in 1987 brought together participants from Western and Eastern Europe 
to discuss a study of non-custodial alternatives in Europe, which HEUNI had 
commissioned (HEUNI, 1988; Bishop, 1988).  
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At the same conference it became clear, however, that the (regional) 
initiatives of the Council of Europe had begun to overtake the United Nations on 
non-custodial sanctions. The first of these was a failure: In 1964 a European 
Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released 
Offenders had been adopted by the Council of Europe. However, in practice the 
Convention has been used very rarely: by 2008 it had been ratified by only 12 
states, several of which made lengthy reservations thereto. 
Subsequently, however, the Council of Europe was much more successful in 
shaping the European debate about the form that non±custodial punishments 
should take. This was reflected in an impressive list of Resolutions and 
Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers. Three stand out.  The first was 
the 1965 Resolution that GHDOW EULHIO\ ZLWK µ6XVSHQGHG 6HQWHQFHs, Probation and 
2WKHU $OWHUQDWLYHV WR ,PSULVRQPHQW¶. ,W HPSKDVLVHG WKH µGLVDGYDQWDJHV¶ RI
imprisonment and in its key substantive provision combined the 19th century view 
of the place of the suspended sentence with notions of probation, recommending 
that:  
member countries' legislations [sic] should authorise the judge, or other 
competent authority, to substitute for a sentence involving deprivation of 
liberty, or for the execution of such a sentence before it has been carried out, 
a conditional measure (suspended sentence, probation order, or similar 
measures) in the case of any person who is a first offender and who has not 
committed an offence of special gravity. 
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A second resolution in 1970, on the µSractical organisation of measures for 
the supervision and after-care of conditionally sentenced or conditionally released 
offenders¶ blurred the differences between suspended sentences and probation by 
encouraging the use of conditional non-custodial sentences. It also supported 
further conditional release for offenders with criminal records, as part of its 
explicitly stated objective of avoiding the use of imprisonment. This broadening of 
the mandate, as well as recognition of the desirability of the establishment of 
common principles for the use of conditional measures paved the way for the 1992 
Recommendations. 
In 1976 a third RHVROXWLRQ µRQ VRPH DOWHUQDWLYH SHQDO PHDVXUHV WR
LPSULVRQPHQW¶IROORZHG,WFRQILGHQWO\LGHQWLILHGDµWHQGHQF\ZKLFKLVREVHUYDEOHLQ
DOOPHPEHUVWDWHVWRDYRLGSULVRQVHQWHQFHV¶DQGH[WRlled the virtues of a common 
crime policy amongst member states of the Council of Europe. The substance of the 
Resolution recommended that member states remove legal obstacles to imposing 
alternatives to imprisonment and suggested the expanded use of various practical 
measures, such as increased housing for probationers and community work, as well 
as the use of fines on a broader basis.  
The 1976 Resolution was based on a detailed study conducted by the 
European Committee on Crime Problems (1976) of the Alternative Penal Measures 
to Imprisonment that were then available in the Council of Europe member states. 
A feature of this study was the depth of its analysis. It began by situating criminal 
justice in the context of wider social policy and emphasised that other systems of 
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social control had a key part to play, not only in assisting the criminal justice 
system but in avoiding invoking it at all. It recognised the stigmatising effect of 
every institutional form of social control including criminal justice interventions and 
therefore argued that all penal interventions, custodial or otherwise, ought to be 
used as minimally, and to intervene as little as possible in the lives of offenders. 
:KLOHLWQRWHGWKDWµIRUPDQ\RIIHQGHUVVXSHUYLVLRQRQSUREDWLRQZDVOLNely to be at 
OHDVWDVHIIHFWLYHLQSUHYHQWLQJUHFLGLYLVPDVDFXVWRGLDOVHQWHQFH¶ LWXQDQLPRXVO\
supported the more extensive use of fines, which it found had even lower 
recidivism rates than imprisonment or probation (European Committee on Crime 
Problems, 1976:28).        
In 1986 Rentzman and Robert built on this study as the basis for a further 
report, Alternative Measures to Imprisonment, which they presented to the annual 
Conference of Directors of Prison Administrations, held by the Council of Europe. In 
this report, the differences between a suspended sentence and probation order are 
HIIHFWLYHO\EXULHGWKH\ZHUHVLPSO\GHVFULEHGDVµGLIIHUHQWOHJDOIRUPVRISUREDWLRQ¶
(Rentzman and Robert, 1986: 9). The Conference of Directors of Prison 
Administrations endorsed the 1976 Resolution, but went further and called for the 
&RXQFLORI(XURSHWRGHYHORSµEDVLFUXOHVIRUWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
of non-FXVWRGLDOVHQWHQFHVRQFHWKHRIIHQGHUKDGEHHQGHFODUHGJXLOW\¶5HQW]PDQ
and Robert, 1986: 35). Such Rules, the Conference of Directors insisted, should 
include a code of ethics for those responsible for enforcement, and safeguards for 
RIIHQGHUV¶ ULJKWV ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH &RQIHUHQFH RI 'LUHFWRUV RI 3ULVRQ
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Administrations highlighted the need to respect human rights in the implementation 
of non-custodial sentences.   
The Rentzman and Robert report formed the basis for deliberations on what 
would eventually become the 1992 European Rules on Community Sanctions and 
Measures. One should not lose sight of the fact that the consensus that the 
Rentzman and Robert report represented was also consistently underpinned by a 
call for the reduction in the use of imprisonment and that this aspect was reflected 
in the reductionist elements of the 1992 Recommendation on Consistency in 
Sentencing. 
Comprehensive standards adopted (1988-1992) 
Immediate support for the emerging European consensus was provided by two 
international instruments, the 1988 Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Implementation of Non-Custodial Measures involving the Restriction of Liberty 
(Groningen Rules) and the 1990 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-
Custodial Measures (Tokyo Rules). In order to understand the scope of the 1992 
European instruments, the European Rule on Community Sanctions and Measures 
and the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing, it is necessary to refer to 
the Groningen and Tokyo Rules too, as they crystalized the ideals of the time. Their 
influence on these key European instruments was considerable, not least because 
many of the same experts were involved in drafting them. Taken together, the four 
instruments give a snapshot of international standard-setting at perhaps the most 
crucial point in its development.  
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Standard Minimum Rules for the Implementation of Non-Custodial Measures 
involving the Restriction of Liberty (Groningen Rules). Chronologically, the 
1988 Groningen Rules were the first in this series. Although they were the product 
of an NGO, the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation (IPPF), and 
therefore had no formal legal status, they were important worldwide. In part, the 
Groningen Rules were taken seriously because of the status of the IPPF, the 
predecessor organisation of which, the International Penal and Penitentiary Council, 
had been responsible for the drafting of an early version of what became the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. To a greater 
extent, however, the Groningen Rules were important as a ground-breaking set of 
standards drafted by an influential international group of, largely European, 
academics and civil servants who, both as individuals and through the IPPF, sought 
to shape the other standards that were being developed at roughly the same time. 
Indeed, the preamble to the Groningen Rules noted that both the United Nations 
and the Council of Europe were already working in this area and invited them to 
make use of these new Rules.   
The Groningen Rules focussed narrowly on interventionist non-custodial measures. 
Moreover, the Commentary to the Rules makes it clear that they were not intended 
WR EH µLQVWUXPHQWV WR SURPRWH WKH LQFUHDVHG XVH RI QRQ-custodial sanctions and 
measures LQJHQHUDO¶,33), 1988: 18) and that they did not deal with general crime 
and sentencing policy. Quite intentionally, they mostly addressed authorities 
responsible for enforcement. What the Groningen Rules emphasised were the 
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human, civil and political rights of the individuals subject to liberty restrictions in 
the community (Rule 4). Other rules specifically guaranteed their privacy (Rule 5) 
and provided procedural safeguards against the abuse of power (Rules 14-16).  
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (Tokyo 
Rules). The Tokyo Rules, in partial contrast to the Groningnen Rules, dealt 
predominantly with sentencing policy and µsafeguards against abuses, with the 
fundamental aim of ensuring that Member States develop non-custodial measures 
µto provide other options, thus reducing the use of imprisonment, and to rationalize 
FULPLQDO MXVWLFHSROLFLHV«¶ 5XOH. The official Commentary to the Tokyo Rules 
emphasised that the aim of this Rule was an overall reduction of imprisonment. It 
H[SODLQHGWKDW µ>W@KLVVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGWRUHIHUQRWRQO\WRDUHGXFWLRQLQWKH
number of custodial measures imposed (including both pre-trial detention and 
prison sentences), but also to a reduction of the actual length of any such 
GHSULYDWLRQ¶8QLWHG1DWLRQV93: 7). 
The wider context within which the Tokyo Rules sought to operate is underlined by 
Rule 2.6 and 2.7, which provide respectively WKDWµ>Q@on-custodial measures should 
be used in accordance with the principle of minimum intervention¶DQGWKDWWKHLU
XVHµshould be part of the movement towards depenalization and decriminalization, 
instead of interfering with or delaying efforts in that direction¶. 
The official Commentary warns presciently that:   
Rule 2.7 places the development and use of non-custodial measures firmly 
in the context of the movement towards restricting and reducing the use of 
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criminal law and the numbers of persons affected by it as the social 
environment changes. Respect for individual rights and freedoms as set out 
in international instruments requires that penal measures should not be 
imposed where they cannot be justified using strict criteria. Since non-
custodial measures are less intrusive than custody there is a danger that 
they may be imposed even when the development of society would no 
longer require it. (United Nations, 1993: 10, emphasis added)  
The Tokyo Rules sought to balance its wider penal policy pronouncements with 
human rights concerns. Thus Rule 1.5, quoted above, goes on to stipulate that such 
SROLFLHV VKRXOG EH IROORZHG µZKLOH WDNLQJ LQWR DFFRXQW WKH REVHUYDQFH RI KXPDQ
rights, the requirements of social justice and the rehabilitation needs of the 
RIIHQGHU¶$Vwith the Groningen Rules, the human rights concerns were spelt out 
in subsequent rules. However, the Tokyo Rules had one distinct limitation: Rule 1.3 
provided that:  
The [Tokyo] Rules shall be implemented taking into account the political, 
economic, social and cultural conditions of each country and the aims and 
objectives of its criminal justice system.   
This qualification rather undermined the thrust of the Tokyo Rules as a whole, for 
countries were virtually invited to justify their existing practices on the basis of 
prevailing conditions rather than to re-examine them in the light of human rights 
principles (Morgenstern, 2002: 86). Could European instruments give tighter 
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protection to human rights, while retaining the reductionist focus of the Tokyo 
Rules? 
The European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures. The answer to 
the first half of this question was given by the  European Rules on Community 
Sanctions and Measures, which provide considerable protection against human 
rights abuses for those persons subject to community sanctions. The human rights 
guarantees in these Rules are more extensive than those in the Tokyo Rules. Rule 
22 of the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures provides that: 
µ7KH QDWXUH RI DOO FRPPXQLW\ VDQFWLRQV DQG PHDVXUHV DQG WKH PDQQHU RI WKHLU
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQVKDOOEHLQ OLQHZLWKDQ\LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\JXDUDQWHHGKXPDQULJKWV¶
And Rule 22 is only one of nine rules, Rules 20 to 29, in a chapter of the  European 
Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures WLWOHG µ5HVSHFW IRU )XQGDPHQWDO
5LJKWV¶ 7KHVH IXUWKHU UXOHV FRYHU PDWWHUV VXFK DV WKH SULYDF\ DQG GLJQLW\ RI
offenders in even more detail than the Groningen Rules. The principle of legality is 
highlighted too. Not only must community sanctions and measures be defined in 
law and not be of indefinite duration, but the procedures for imposing and enforcing 
them must be specified in law too (Rules 3 -11).   
Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing. The European Rules on 
Community Sanctions and Measures were complemented by the less well-known 
Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing, adopted by the Council of Europe 
in the same year. In as much as it dealt with community sanctions the 
Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing saw them as part of a wider range 
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of non-custodial sanctions. The use of such sanctions is encouraged as part of a 
reductionist strategy, which includes also the use of fines, to ensure that 
imprisonment is used only as a last resort and for the minimum period possible 
(Ashworth, 1994).  
Although neither the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing nor the 
European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures is µKDUGODZ¶LQWKHVHQVHRf 
being a binding treaty, they were a product of a treaty-based organisation, the 
Council of Europe. From the perspective of the time, the European Rules on 
Community Sanctions and Measures in particular seemed to provide a legal basis 
for the entrenchment of a comprehensive and eventually binding legal framework 
that would prevent the abuse of community sanctions (Van Zyl Smit, 1993). It 
would not have been unreasonable to predict that, as the legality principle was 
extended to cover community sanctions and measures more comprehensively, their 
legitimacy would be increased too. Around that time this was beginning to happen 
with similar international and European rules for prisons (Van Zyl Smit, 2013), 
which the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures sought to parallel. 
Before tracing how this would develop further, however, we need to consider some 
of the ideas that were not incorporated in the 1992 instruments. 
 
Underplaying existing ideas in the lead up to 1992 
Liberal scepticism  
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The eventual acceptance of comprehensive European standards for community 
sanctions and measures meant that some existing ideas had to be abandoned. One 
of these, voiced during the run-up to the Groningen Rules, was a liberal scepticism 
about the utility of international rule-making in this area. It was articulated in a 
remarkable paper presented to an IPPF colloquium in Poitiers in 1987 by William 
Bohan, a senior civil servant in the English Home Office (Bohan, 1989). In his paper 
Bohan supported interventions that would reduce prison populations but argued 
that international rules were badly suited to regulating such interventions. In his 
view, successful intervention emphasised the non-criminal justice aspects of 
community treatment. %RKDQ¶Vapproach reflected a revival of neo-classical ideals, 
which emphasised that offenders should take personal responsibility for their 
conduct. However, meeting their social needs should not be the function of penal 
institutions, lest these institutions become disproportionately repressive. 
The model of traditional English probation was prominent in %RKDQ¶V 
presentation. He UHIHUUHGDSSURYLQJO\WR µWKHSURIHVVLRQDOFDVHZRUNUHODWLRQVKLSLQ
ZKLFKWKHSUREDWLRQRIILFHU¶VZDUPDQGVLQFHUHFRQFHUQIHUWLOLVHVWKHSUREDWLRQHU¶V
FDSDFLW\ IRUJURZWKDQGFKDQJH¶EXWDVNHG UKHWRULFDOO\: µDUH WKHUH WREH VWDQGDUG
PLQLPXPUXOHVIRUWKHSUDFWLFHRI IULHQGVKLS"¶Bohan (1989: 46). Although he did 
not argue that there should be a separation between the social work and purely 
penal aspects of community sanctions - that is, that steps should be taken to 
ensure that offenders could be sentenced to social work ± Bohan played down the 
abuses that could arise in both social work interventions and in the more restrictive 
aspects of community sanctions. He concluded that in any event, given divergent 
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practices in this area, the development of international standards for community 
sanctions was premature. 
3HUKDSV XQVXUSULVLQJO\ %RKDQ¶V FRQFOXVLRQV ZHUH QRW VXSSRUWHG E\ DQ\
other IPPF member. Many of them, like the chairman, Hans Tulkens (1989), simply 
stressed that international standards were needed to protect persons subject to 
community sanctions against abuse.  
One of the most interesting responses came to Bohan from Edgardo Rotman, 
who was already establishing his reputation as a leading theorist of rehabilitation. 
According to Rotman (1986), rehabilitation should be seen not as a philosophy 
IDYRXULQJSDWHUQDOLVWLFDQGRSSUHVVLYHIRUPVRI LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQRIIHQGHUV¶ OLYHVEXW
rather as a right of offenders to enjoy opportunities to improve themselves. He 
conceded that Bohan correctly questioned whether there are minimum standards 
for friendship. However, Rotman argued that the function of standard minimum 
UXOHV ZDV WR FUHDWH µFHUWDLQ Rbjective conditions that make interpersonal action 
SRVVLEOHDQGPHDQLQJIXO¶ 5RWPDQ, +HH[SODLQHG WKDW VXFK UXOHV µQRW
only help to avoid abuses in state intervention but also establish positive duties of 
the state to provide certain services and opportunities with a minimum degree of 
TXDOLW\DQG IUHTXHQF\¶ Rotman, 1989: 170). As explained below, this notion of a 
positive duty on states to provide opportunities for offenders was adopted by 
supporters of an expanded role for community sanctions in the future. 
%RKDQ¶V UHPDUNV ZHUH PDGH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI D GHEDWH DERXW D VSHFLILF
proposal to introduce rules to govern community sanctions and measures and one 
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can understand why they were resisted. What was missing in the wider debates of 
the late VZDVDQ\H[SOLFLWGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHµWUDGLWLRQDO¶VXVSHQGHGVHQWHQFH
that is, the sentence that placed no additional burden on the offender other than 
the requirement that he should not commit further offences.  
One may have anticipated some support for this sentence on the grounds 
that it did not intervene unnecessarily in the lives of those subjected to it. However, 
proponents of intervention were on the rise.  Looking back on this period, the 
Cambridge criminologist, Sir Leon Radzinowicz expressed his contempt both for the 
ROG µSXUH¶ VXVSHQGHG VHQWHQFH DQG IRU VHQWHQFHV VXVSHQGHG RQ PRUH HODERUDWH
conditions: 
I turned against [the suspended sentence] in the most categorical terms. I 
tried to show that [it] was largely used on the continent faute de mieux, 
simply because they did not have probation or conditional discharge; that in 
comparison the suspended sentence was definitely inferior; and if added to 
probation and conditional discharge it would harm their basic distinctiveness 
and in practice confuse both the offenders concerned and the courts. 
(Radzinowicz, 1999: 329).  
Radical non-interventionism 
Support for the traditional suspended sentence may have been expected, especially 
for those who favoured various forms of penal non-interventionism. In Europe a 
movement favouring radical non-interventionism had been taking shape in 
academic penology since the late 1960s. Some of its intellectual antecedents lay in 
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the work of the American sociologist Edwin Schur (1973) and were much bolstered 
E\WKHZLGHO\SXEOLVKHGILQGLQJWKDWLQWKHVSKHUHRIUHKDELOLWDWLRQµQRWKLQJZRUNV¶
(Martinson, 1974). Schur's approach was largely based on a critique of traditional 
approaches to rehabilitation, which it berated for an unjustified determinism.   
 In Europe, radical non-interventionism took the form of an abolitionist 
critique of the prison as the site of penal processes (van Swaaningen, 1997: 116-
130). Some Europeans from this tradition were prepared to work with the Council 
of Europe in order to propose reforms that would reduce the scope of criminal law 
in society generally (Cf. Hulsman, 1980, 1984). However, they do not appear to 
have engaged directly in the 1992 standard-setting on non-custodial sanctions.  
 Perhaps it was the extent to which the standards of this period collectively 
held out the promise of a reduction of prison numbers that led European 
abolitionists to pay little attention to them and certainly not to critique them 
directly. In fairness, recommendations of the Council of Europe adopted in 1992, 
and subsequently in the rest of the 1990s could be seen to give hope to more 
incremental abolitionists, who reluctantly accepted that the abolition of prisons 
could not be achieved in a single step. Thus the 1999 Recommendation concerning 
0HGLDWLRQLQ3HQDO0DWWHUVVDZLWVREMHFWLYHDVHQFRXUDJLQJµPRUHFRQVWUXFWLYHDQG
less repressive penal oXWFRPHV¶(YHQPRUH WR WKHSRLQWZDVDQRWKHU UHGXFWLRQLVW
recommendation adopted in 1999 concerning Prison Overcrowding and Prison 
Population Inflation. Basic Principle 1 of this Recommendation provided:   
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Deprivation of liberty should be regarded as a sanction or measure of last 
resort and should therefore be provided for only where the seriousness of 
the offence would make any other sanction or measure clearly inadequate. 
Penal abolitionists ought perhaps to have been worried about Basic Principle 4 of 
the same Recommendation:    
Provision should be made for an appropriate array of community sanctions 
and measures, possibly graded in terms of relative severity; prosecutors and 
judges should be prompted to use them as widely as possible.        
Why did it nRWFRQWLQXH WRVD\ µLQRUGHU WR UHSODFHVHQWHQFHVRI LPSULVRQPHQW¶RU
words with similar effect? In the 1990s it may have been reasonable to assume 
that this was implicit in the context of the Recommendation as a whole. In the 
following decade, however, this assumption could not readily be made, as the next 
section demonstrates.   
  
Ambiguities in 21st century standards  
Close analysis of 21st century Council of Europe recommendations related to non-
custodial sanctions reveals a change of emphasis, with the inherent value of such 
dispositions being highlighted and practical means for implementing them being 
stressed. At the same time, relatively less attention began to be paid to their 
function of assisting in the reduction in the use of imprisonment and, in some 
instances, to the risks they posed to the human rights of offenders. 
26 
 
 Recommendation on Improving Implementation of the European 
Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures (2000). 
In 2000 the Recommendation on Improving Implementation of the European Rules 
on Community Sanctions and Measures was adopted.  The official Commentary to 
this Recommendation reveals a subtle shift in the underlying attitude. It noted that, 
DOWKRXJK IRU D WLPH D µQRWKLQJ ZRUNV¶ SKLORVRSK\ KDG SUHGRPLQDWHG WKH RYHUDOO 
climate had changed and, notably as a result of Canadian research6 and extensive 
meta-analyses, a more optimistic view had come into being. This had led to the 
development of cognitive-behavioural and psycho-social interventions with greatly 
improved possibilities to help offenders to adjust in society (para.30). Subsequently, 
the Commentary concluded confidently that: 
These methods, based on accepted theories are increasingly being used as a 
basis for national strategies to improve the effectiveness of community 
sanctions and measures. (para. 140) 
This conclusion is not surprising. It reflects the 'what works' strategy strongly 
championed by Sir Graham Smith, the chairman of the committee of experts that 
advised on this Recommendation, as an antidote to µQRWKLQJZRUNV¶SHVVLPLVP,Q
KLVSUHSDUDWRU\SDSHUµ&RPPXQLW\6DQFWLRQVDQG0HDVXUHV± :KDW:RUNV¶6PLWK 
(1998) expressed support for the risk-needs-responsivity approach, which 
XQGHUSLQVWKHµZKDWZRUNV
VWUDWHJ\. 
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The 2000 Recommendation on Improving Implementation of the European 
Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures reflected this positive commitment to 
the use of community sanctions. While it still referred to human rights, it was also 
strongly positive about community sanctions and measures as a means of risk 
management. The Recommendation amended the provision of the European Rules 
on Community Sanctions and Measures that previously outlawed indeterminate 
community sanctions. They were now held to be acceptable if someone posed a 
continuing grave threat to life, health or safety in the community. Admittedly, such 
continuation was to be subject to review. The fact remained that a previously strict 
VDIHJXDUG KDG EHHQ PRGLILHG DQG WKDW WKH HPSKDVLV ZDV QRZ RQ WKH µHIIHFWLYH
supervision and contURO RI RIIHQGHUV¶ 5XOH  DV D ZD\ RI PDNLQJ µDGHTXDWH
SURYLVLRQIRUFRPPXQLW\VDIHW\¶&RPPHQWDU\RQ5XOH 
Another interesting dimension was the extent to which the Recommendation 
was a tool for propagating the use of community sanctions and measures. The 
&RPPHQWDU\PDGHLWH[SOLFLWWKDWµGLIILFXOWLHVH[LVW>HG@QRWDEO\EXWQRWH[FOXVLYHO\
in eastern and central European countries where opportunities to use community 
VDQFWLRQVDQGPHDVXUHV>ZHUH@RIWHQLQDQHDUO\VWDJHRIGHYHORSPHQW¶SDUD
It hinted that it was up to European countries with well-established community 
sentencing regimes to overcome these difficulties.  
2003 Recommendation concerning Conditional Release (Parole). 
The same commitment to community based programmes was reflected in the 2003 
Recommendation concerning Conditional Release (Parole). As has become apparent, 
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the mechanism of imposing a sentence, then suspending it conditionally, in whole 
or in part, and thus releasing the offender was one of the most important bases of 
non-custodial punishment in Europe. By the beginning of the 21st century many 
such sentences differed little, if at all, from the conditional release of prisoners who 
had already served part of their terms of imprisonment. Indeed, statistics in 
Germany still lump together offenders whose prison sentences are suspended 
conditionally immediately on imposition and those who are released after having 
served part of them in prison (Dünkel and Pruin 2010).  
Historically, suspension and sometimes also early release were subject only 
to the single condition that offenders not commit further offences during the period 
of suspension. Only gradually were further conditions attached. Even so, across 
much of Europe the majority of suspensions and many releases from prison still 
take place subject to the single condition to avoid reoffending. The motivations for 
not imposing further conditions vary. They may be an expedient way of reducing 
prison overcrowding as cheaply as possible (Beyens et al, 2013). However, there 
may also be a principled policy, as in Finland, of making reoffending the only 
condition that can lead to re-imprisonment for both parolees and those with 
conditional sentences (Lappi-Seppällä, 2010). Yet Paragraph 1 of the 2003 
Recommendation defines conditional early release narrowly, DVµWKHHDUO\UHOHDVHRI
sentenced prisoners under individualised post-UHOHDVH FRQGLWLRQV¶. The same 
Paragraph SURYLGHV IXUWKHU µ$PQHVWLHV DQG SDUGRQV DUH QRW LQFOXGHG LQ WKLV
GHILQLWLRQ¶ 
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Paragraph 2 emphasises that: µ&RQGLWLRQDOUHOHDVHLVDFRPPXQLW\PHDVXUH¶
The Recommendation on Conditional Release thus excludes from its ambit releases 
on the simple condition of not reoffending, as not sufficiently interventionist to 
FRXQW DV µFRQGLWLRQDO¶ IRU LWV SXUSRVHV :KDW Pakes this more serious is that in 
some European countries,7 the period during which a former prisoner will be subject 
to post-release conditions may routinely be significantly longer than the original 
prison sentence. 8  The practical outcome is that where additional conditions are 
imposed, prisoners refuse release because it means that they will be under state 
control for longer (whilst subject to a high risk of recall) than if they remain in 
prison.9  
 The Recommendation on Conditional Release, as its preamble makes clear, 
was designed to reduce the prison population. Nevertheless, by its narrow definition 
RIµFRQGLWLRQDO¶WKH5HFRPPHQGDWLRQPD\LQDGYHUWHQWO\10 encourage the setting of 
conditions, thus ignoring the injunction of the Tokyo Rules that restrictive penal 
measures should not be unjustifiably imposed, and the related insight in the same 
Rules, that, since non-custodial measures are less intrusive than custody, there is a 
danger that they may be imposed even where they are not required.11 This can be 
explained by the growing confidence expressed in the Preamble to the 
Recommendation on Conditional Release that conditional release, in the 
LQWHUYHQWLRQLVW ZD\ LW LV GHILQHG LV µRQH RI WKH PRVW HIIHFWLYH DQG FRQVWUXFWLYH
means of preventing reoffenGLQJDQGSURPRWLQJUHVHWWOHPHQW¶ 
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2008 EU Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of probation 
decisions (FD 947) 
Chronologically, the next European instrument to emerge on an aspect of 
community sanctions was the 2008 Framework Decision of the European 
&RPPLVVLRQµRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHSULQFLSOHRIPXWXDOUHFRJQLWLRQWRMXGJPHQWV
and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and 
DOWHUQDWLYHVDQFWLRQV¶,WZDVH[SOLFLWO\GHVLJQHGWRVHWXSDPRUHHIIHFWLYHV\VWHP
for enforcing community sanctions imposed in one EU member state on a national 
of another EU member state. Here too, the primary motive seems to have been to 
increase the use of community sanctions. Arguably though, this was not being done 
for its own sake but to reduce the use of imprisonment of foreign nationals, by 
enabling them to serve a community sentence in their own country rather than a 
sentence of imprisonment in the sentencing country (Morgenstern 2009). This 
positive view of the Framework Decision is reinforced by the careful way in which it 
has been interpreted, as requiring those who implement it to emphasise the social 
rehabilitative function of the sentences that fall within its purview (Snacken and 
McNeill, 2012).   
In practice though, the Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of 
probation decisions may prove as ineffective as the 1964 Council of Europe 
Convention. 12 The states to which it could apply are limited to the 28 members of 
the European Union and its scope is therefore far from pan-European. Moreover, by 
February 2014 only 14 had fulfilled their obligations to transpose it into their 
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national law, effectively making implementation impossible for the time being.13 In 
addition, states have a right14 to opt out of certain Framework Decisions prior to 1 
December 2014. It seems likely that the United Kingdom will do so in this case. 
What is significant about the adoption of the Framework Decision on the mutual 
recognition of probation decisions is that it reflects a growing commitment of the 
EU to involve itself in penal matters, including non-custodial sanctions (Baker, 
2013). This perhaps explains why so much effort has been devoted to clarifying a 
directive that is unlikely to have much direct impact. Although the focus of the EU is 
still on implementing sentences on an inter-state basis, it follows that the EU now 
also has an interest in developing substantive standards for community sanctions, 
which will make it easier in the future for states to accept - and therefore 
implement where required - the sentences imposed by other European states. 
  
Council of Europe Probation Rules (2010) 
The most recent Council of Europe instrument to deal with non-custodial sanctions, 
the Council of Europe Probation Rules, follows the pattern of others adopted in the 
21st century, in that their primary purpose is to propagate community sanctions and 
measures and, in this case, also to entrench the position of probation agencies. To 
some extent this may be a product of the involvement of the CEP, which lobbied 
strongly for their creation, contributed actively to their formulation,15 and now uses 
WKHPDVDQH[DPSOHRIZKDWµ(XURSH¶UHTXLUHV16 However, the Probation Rules also 
deliberately set out to establish the institutions of probation as a counterweight to 
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well-entrenched prison services and thus to provide opportunities for community 
sanctions and measures to be implemented.     
 
A close reading of the Probation Rules shows that, while they endorse the 
human rights protections of the European Rules on Community Sanctions and 
Measures and on occasion even expand on them, for a large part they are a 
recommendation on how probation agencies should be run and their status 
SURWHFWHG 2QH RI WKH µEDVLF SULQFLSOHV¶ RI WKH 3UREDWLRQ 5XOHV LV WKDW µ3UREDWLRQ
agencies shall be accorded an appropriate standing and recognition and shall be 
DGHTXDWHO\ UHVRXUFHG¶ 5XOH  7KH HPSKDVLV LV QRW RQ WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ RI
µFRPPXQLW\ VDQFWLRQV RU PHDVXUHV¶ RU HYHQ µSUREDWLRQ¶ DV DQ DFWLYLW\ EXW RQ
µSUREDWLRQDJHQFLHV¶ 
 
It is of course appropriate for the Council of Europe to attempt to set standards 
for and generally develop the skills of criminal justice professionals, be they police 
officers, judges or those involved with the implementation of sentences as prison or 
probation officers. One of strengths of the Council of Europe as a human rights 
organisation is that it has good access to the civil servants of its member states. By 
working with existing national bureaucracies the Council can often achieve greater 
state adhesion to its human rights objectives. However, the important difference 
between the Probation Rules and similar recommendations about prisons is that, 
while the latter makes no case for the increased use of imprisonment, the Probation 
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5XOHVVHHNWRPDNHDSRVLWLYHFDVHIRUµSUREDWLRQ
DVthe best way of dealing with a 
large class of offenders. 
 
What the Council of Europe Probation Rules have in common with other recent 
recommendations on aspects of non-custodial sanctions is their reliance in the on 
the µZKDWZRUNV¶DSSURDFK, which also has considerable support in the CEP.17 While 
WKHUH DUH VRPH UHIHUHQFHV WR µGHVLVWDQFH¶ Rules 57, 76, glossary) and to the 
strength-EDVHGµ*RRG/LYHV0RGHO¶Rules 66, 67), the Rules are heavily influenced 
E\ WKH µ5LVN-Need-5HVSRQVLYLW\¶ PRGHO RI µwhat works¶ (Rules 66, 71).  What is 
ODUJHO\DEVHQWLVUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWWKHµZKDWZRUNV¶PRYHPHQWZLWKLWVHPSKDVLVRQ
risks, needs and responsivity of individual offenders, has been subject to sustained 
academic critique of both the narrowness of its specific methods 18  and its 
indifference to its wider social impact (Mair, 2004). Indeed, Rule 66 requires that 
DVVHVVPHQWVµVKDOO¶EHPDGHXVLQJZKDWLVHVVHQWLDOO\WKH5LVN-Needs-Responsivity 
approach, thus applying concepts that may be literally incomprehensible to officials 
not schooled in that tradition (Herzog-Evans, 2011: 121).  
 
Missing from the Probation Rules is any systematic attempt to link the Rules 
to the objective, mentioned in its Preamble, of reducing the prison population. It is 
likely that expanding probation agencies, which the Rules encourage and promote, 
will facilitate greater use of particular kinds of community sanctions and measures, 
but will that necessarily reduce prison numbers? What are the relative costs and 
benefits both to offenders and broDGHU VRFLHW\RIPRUH µSUREDWLRQ¶ DVRSSRVHG WR
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non-custodial alternatives that are less interventionist than community sanctions 
and measures? These questions are not posed directly by the Probation Rules or the 
Commentary on it.  
 
Conclusion: The way forward 
 Increasingly, pan-European organisations, not only the Council of Europe but now 
also the European Union, have involved themselves actively in the introduction and 
implementation of community sanctions and measures (Canton, 2009a, 2009b: 73-
74; cf. Baker, 2013). Such sanctions are more interventionist than fines and 
sentences suspended on the sole condition of not reoffending, which in recent years 
have not been promoted as vigorously. Pan-European organisations such as the 
CEP have sponsored the deYHORSPHQW RI :HVWHUQ (XURSHDQ VW\OH µSUREDWLRQ¶
particularly in central and eastern European countries. The EU has also played a 
role through its support for large research programmes on community sanctions 
and measures (cf. McNeill and Beyens, 2013).  
With the extra money and resources being invested in community sanctions 
and measures, pressures to propagate probation are greater than ever. The 
distance between the 1992 commitment to (mild) abolitionism and the modern 
state of play in Europe ± ZKLFKLVVZLIWO\DSSURDFKLQJDVWDWHRIµPDVVVXSHUYLVLRQ¶ 
(McNeill and Beyens, 2013) - ought not to be understated. 
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Under these circumstances, the time is ripe to critically re-evaluate 
arguments from the perspectives of liberal scepticism and radical non-
interventionism that were made in the past, as well as those from a human rights 
perspective, in order to ensure that probation, as it has now evolved, does not 
become an unnecessarily restrictive response.  
Liberal scepticism       
The liberal sceptical argument advanced by Bohan (1989; see 3(a) above) did not 
reject ameliorative intervention in social problems of the kind offered by traditional 
social work designed simply to help those in need. What it did challenge was 
whether this could be done through a regulated system of community sanctions.  
That challenge remains. There is a risk that the positive claims made for 
community sanctions and measures lead to disproportionate interventions. 
Moreover, taking into account the social vulnerability of many offenders and victims, 
we should question whether the social work assistance that they require could 
possibly be better provided outside the penal system.   
In particular, the move away from the simple suspended sentence should be 
re-examined. One needs to ask whether offenders would not be better off if they 
were routinely given sentences suspended on the sole condition that they not 
reoffend for a set period.  It would then be left to other, external social support 
systems to assist them during the period of suspension and make it less likely that 
they will relapse into crime. Such a development would provide a solution where 
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offenders refuse early release from prison because they find the accompanying 
FRQGLWLRQVRIµSUREDWLRQ¶WRRRQHURXVDQGobject to their being enforced for longer 
than the duration of the prison term.19  
Radical non-interventionism  
In its European guise radical non-interventionism focused largely on prison 
abolitionism (see 3(b) above). A revival of its ideas would pay much more attention 
to less interventionist non-custodial punishments such as fines, which in some 
jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, have been replaced to a significant extent 
by community sanctions and measures (Cavadino et al, 2013: 120). Such a revival 
would note that this trend is not universal. In jurisdictions such as Belgium 
(Snacken, 2007) and Germany (Sevdiren, 2011: 183), fines still play a large part in 
the overall framework of penal sanctions without any apparent loss of efficacy of 
the system as a whole. A revived radical non-interventionism could emphasise the 
contrast between relatively non-interventionist punishments and community 
sanctions and measures, which restrict liberty to an extent that in some cases can 
parallel or even exceed the pains of imprisonment. For community sanctions and 
measures this has been acknowledged by some European scholars (see Boone, 
2005) but has not really fed into the European debate about the desirability of the 
expanded use of community sanctions as opposed to other non-custodial sanctions.  
 The early critique of rehabilitationism by radical non-interventionists is 
widely rejected because it allegedly addressed only the straw-man of deterministic 
forms of compulsory rehabilitation. Defenders of community sanctions argue at 
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times that a more sophisticated understanding of rehabilitation has now emerged 
(McNeill, 2009; Canton, 2007, 2011: 41-45; McKnight, 2009).  Such an 
understanding was developed by Rotman (1986, 1989) who argued that the right of 
the offender to opportunities to rehabilitate himself held the key to constructing 
forms of community sanctions that recognise ofIHQGHUDJHQF\DQGDUHERWKµSRVLWLYH¶
and human rights compliant.  
 This argument is not without merit. Certainly for offenders in whose lives the 
state intervenes by way of punishment, a case can be made for recognizing their 
right to opportunities to improve themselves. However, such a case is subject to 
two qualifications. First, there must be recognition that even the rehabilitative 
measures advocated by supporters of the expanded use of community penalties do 
involve elements of compulsion. 20  To this extent the original radical 
noninterventionist critique is still directly relevant.  
 Secondly, it must be recognised that for offenders to be able to exercise a 
right to rehabilitation in the positive sense that term is used by Rotman (1986) - or 
a right to reintegration, as it is sometimes termed (cf. Dwyer, 2013: 10) - 
appropriate material and social conditions must be in place. As Carlen (2013) has 
pointed out forcefully, the right to rehabilitation based on rational choices being 
made by the offender may be illusory, for it often presumes socially competent 
offenders who were at one stage part of a stable, non-deviant community to which 
they can return. For many offenders in unequal, class-bound societies, such a 
community no longer exists ± if it ever did (cf. Lacey and Zedner, 1995). Under 
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such circumstances, which may be far more prevalent than governments or even 
scholarly proponents of intervention are prepared to recognise, the judicious 
exercise of the prerogative of mercy leading to unconditional release may still be 
more effective in giving offenders opportunities to lead crime free lives.    
Human rights    
Human rights idealism was a key element in the creation of the instruments 
discussed in this paper. Whatever weaknesses they may have, these instruments 
all seek to reinforce the position of offenders who serve their sentences in the 
community. This was true not only in 1992 but also thereafter. Also, the most 
recent of these instruments, FD 947 and the Council of Europe Probation Rules, 
express their commitment to human rights values and seek to entrench them. 
However, at the same time, these instruments eQFRXUDJHLQWHUYHQWLRQVLQRIIHQGHUV¶
lives that may limit their freedom more than is strictly necessary.  
How are these negative consequences to be avoided? One way may be by 
reemphasising one of the longest recognised human rights, namely the right to 
liberty (Hudson, 2001; Snacken, 2006). Our overview has shown that the 1992 
instruments sought to balance the needs for intervention by constantly questioning 
whether liberty-limiting interventions, whether custodial or otherwise, were 
required at all.21 A second way of avoiding negative consequences is to reflect on 
the range of human rights that need to be considered when developing instruments 
to shape non-custodial interventions, for the pains of probation may encompass a 
broader range of human rights than liberty alone (Durnescu, 2011). In this regard 
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human rights lawyers may seek, for example, to deploy the European Rules on 
Community Sanctions and Measures to support arguments that community 
sanctions that stigmatise offenders by making them wear clothing that publicly 
identify them as person undergoing punishment, are degrading and therefore 
contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.22    
Finally however, old nostrums may not be sufficient. It may be that a 
broader appreciation of human rights is necessary for the full consideration of the 
appropriate use of community sanctions and measures in Europe. In particular, 
overall socio-economic development, underpinned by a recognition of the minimum 
social and economic and cultural rights that all members of society are entitled to 
enjoy, is a more effective way of reducing crime than focusing intensively on the 
individuals, who are convicted of the relatively routine offences that are the target 
of community sanctions and measures. Consistently asking broader questions of 
this kind could allow European penologists to engage with broader social 
developments and to remain critical towards the wide human rights implications of 
any form of penal intervention (cf. Loader and Sparks, 2013).    
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1 The idea was first expressed by the philosopher and orator, Themistius, in a 
speech to the Christian emperor Jovian (362-363 AD), congratulating him on not 
seeking to impose his own morality on his subjects by legislation (Lee, 2000).  
 
40 
 
 
2 This is because community sanctions and measures, as defined in the European 
5XOHV RQ &RPPXQLW\ 6DQFWLRQV DQG 0HDVXUHV µPDLQWDLQ WKH RIIHQGHU LQ WKH
community and involve some restriction of his liberty through the imposition of 
conditions and/or obligations, and which are implemented by bodies designated in 
ODZIRUWKDWSXUSRVH¶ 
3 See Article 7 of the Satzungen der internationalen kriminalistischen Vereinigung 
recorded in (1890) 1 Mitteilungen der internationalen kriminalistischen Vereinigung 
3. 
4 Decided at the third annual meeting of the International Association for Penal Law 
at Kristiana (Oslo) 25 to 27 August 1891. See the (1892) 3 Mitteilungen der 
internationalen kriminalistischen Vereinigung 265-266.  
5  See also the plea at the same Seminar by Paul Cornil (1952) of Belgium for the 
establishment of guilt before the results of a social enquiry report that might 
UHFRPPHQG¶SUREDWLRQ¶ZDVUHYHDOHGWRWKHWULDOFRXUWWKDWPLJKWZLVKWRLPSRVHLW 
6  This is clearly a reference to Gendreau and Andrews (1990).   
7 E.g. Germany (Dünkel and Pruin, 2010); Belgium (Snacken et al, 2010). 
8 3DUD  RI WKH 5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ GRHV SURYLGH WKDW µ&RQGLWLRQV RU VXSHUYLVLRQ
measures should be imposed for a period of time that is not out of proportion to the 
SDUWRIWKHSULVRQVHQWHQFHWKDWKDVQRWEHHQVHUYHG¶7KLVLVDZHDNSURYLVLRQDQG
the Commentary makes it clear that the duration of such supervision can exceed 
the term of imprisonment initially imposed by the court.  
9  In Belgium, for example: Robert (2009). 
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10 Arguably, it was legitimate to focus the bulk of this Recommendation on the 
more interventionist conditions as release only on condition of not reoffending does 
not require rules to ensure that implementation is not harsh or unfair. However, the 
unintended consequence is still the impression that wider conditions are required to 
make the UHOHDVHµFRQGLWLRQDO¶DWDOO 
11 Rules 2.6-2.7 of the Tokyo Rules, above at 1(b). 
12 See 3(C) above. 
13  All member states had undertaken to transpose FD 947 by 6 December 2011.  
See the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on the implementation by the Member States of the Framework Decisions 
2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA on the mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions on custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty, 
on probation decisions and alternative sanctions and on supervision measures as an 
alternative to provisional detention (SWD (2014) 34 final). In this report, released 
on 5 February 2014, the European Commission threatens to take legal action 
against EU member States who have not transposed (or transposed appropriately) 
FD 947 and other Framework Decisions by 1 December 2014.  
14 See art. 10(4), Protocol to the Treaty of Lisbon on Transitional Provisions 
15 See the comment by the Head of the Prison and Probation Unit of the Council of 
(XURSHWKDW µWKH&(3ZLOOEH LQYROYHG LQHYHU\VWHSRIWKHSURFHVV¶RIGUDIWLQJWKH
recommendation that became the Probation Rules: Reported on the CEP website on 
3 June 2008: http://www.cep-probation.org/news/65/40 accessed 16 February 
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2014. According to the report, on 26th and 27th of May 2008 the participants, that is 
the Head of the Prison and Probation Unit of the Council of Europe, the CEP 
Secretary General, and the two expert advisers on the Probation Rules to the 
Council for Penological Cooperation, the organ of the Council of Europe most 
intLPDWHO\LQYROYHGLQWKHGUDIWLQJSURFHVVPHWDWWKH&(3RIILFHVDQGµDJUHHGRQD
structure for the outline of the future draft recommendation, as well as on its 
GHILQLWLRQVDQGLWVEDVLFSULQFLSOHV¶ 
 The Secretary General of the CEP, which has observer status with the Council for 
Penological Cooperation, also attended most of the subsequent official meetings of 
the Council where the Probation Rules were discussed in Strasbourg. The Secretary 
*HQHUDO¶V UROH WKHUH ZHQW EH\RQG WKDW RI REVHUYHU +H ZDV DFWLvely involved in 
consulting probation agencies across Europe about their views and feeding into the 
GUDIWLQJSURFHVVWRPDNHVXUHWKDWWKHQHZ5XOHVZHUHµUHOHYDQW¶WRWKHP&DQWRQ
2009c.   
16  See http://www.cep-probation.org/page/332/european-probation-en-prison-
rules accessed 16 February 2014. 
17 However, the Commentary goes on to make the sound point that countries 
VKRXOGFRQGXFWWKHLURZQUHVHDUFKDQGUHPDLQ µDZDUH WKDW³ZKDWZRUNV´ LQRQH
FRXQWU\PD\QRWZRUNDVZHOOLQDQRWKHU¶ (Official Commentary on Rule 104).For 
the CEP, see WKHSURFHHGLQJVRIWKH&(3FRQIHUHQFHµ3UREDWLRQ:RUNV¶LQ0DODJD
28±29 May 2010, available at http://www.cepprobation.org/ accessed 20 March 
2012. 
 
43 
 
 
18 See Ward et al (2012) for a recent summary of a long-simmering debate about 
the shortcomings of the Risks-Needs-Responsivity model and the more humanist 
µJRRGOLYHV¶DOWHUQDWLYHWRLW 
19  6HH DOVR $PHULFDQ VWXGLHV RI µSXQLVKPHQW HTXLYDOHQFLHV¶ which have used 
quantitative surveys of offender opinion to demonstrate that those with experience 
both of imprisonment and its alternatives often prefer incarceration (Crouch, 1993; 
Wood and Grasmick, 1999).  
20  This is so even in jurisdictions that requirH WKH RIIHQGHU¶V FRQVHQW DV D 
prerequisite for the imposition of community sanctions or measures (cf. van Zyl 
Smit, 1993: 324-326).  At the core of any rehabilitative order is the issue of 
compliance, that is, of ensuring that the requirements of the sanction or measure 
are adhered to (Canton, 2011: 123-126).  Whilst compliance must be secured on a 
number of levels (Bottoms, 2001), it is ultimately mandated by law. Failure to 
engage with the requirements imposed in the name of rehabilitation can lead to 
onerous consequences, potentially including incarceration (cf. Durnescu, 2011: 
538). Under such circumstances the right to receive rehabilitative assistance easily 
becomes a duty to rehabilitate oneself. The more intensive the order, the more 
onerous that compulsion becomes. By contrast, unconditionally suspended 
sentences impose only the same compulsion that criminal justice places upon all 
citizens: not to offend, although the consequences of refusing to obey will be 
harsher for the recidivist offender (cf. Tonry, 2010: 104). 
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21  Some of this sentiment remains at the pan-European political level: See 
Resolution 1938 (2013) µ3URPRWLQJDOWHUQDWLYHV WR LPSULVRQPHQW¶ DGRSWHGE\ WKH
Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, acting 
on behalf of the Assembly, on 31 May 2013. This Resolution carefully stresses that 
µQRQ-custodial sentences should be imposed as a replacement for prison 
sentences and not as a way of further widening the scope of criminal 
punishment. Thus, minor offences which have hitherto not given rise to any 
criminal sanctions should not be punished by non-FXVWRGLDOVHQWHQFHV¶ 
Unfortunately, the resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe have far less impact than recommendations of the Committee of Minsters of 
the Council of Europe as the latter represent the consensual views of the 
governments of member States.   
22.  The European Prison Rules have been used very effectively in this way to spell 
out what should be regarded as degrading treatment of prisoners, contrary to Art 3 
of the ECHR: Van Zyl Smit and Snacken 2009.  
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